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I. The Issue with Metaphysical Realism
Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is ex-actly one true and complete description of ‘the way the world is.’”1 
In Reason, Truth and History, Putnam characterises metaphysical realism as 
1 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 49.
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In the first part of this paper, I present Hilary Putnam’s famous BIV-argument against 
metaphysical realism and find that it relies on the rejection of a noetic-ray theory of 
reference (NTR). In the second part, I demonstrate two ways in which a metaphysical 
realist could save the NTR, and I develop Plantinga’s claim that metaphysical realists can 
only rid of Putnam’s concerns by adopting the thesis that the objects of our conceptual 
schemes roughly correspond to the furniture of reality. Thirdly, I argue that naturalism fails 
to explain such a metaphysically anthropocentric correspondence, and that monotheism 
is the only candidate that does so successfully. In the last part, I show that metaphysical 
realism in fact holds. The line of argumentation is two-fold: pragmatic and theoretical. 
If metaphysical realism does not hold, then normative considerations must guide theory-
choice. But fundamental non-verbal normative disputes are not possible if metaphysical 
realism is false. Hence, there can be no non-equivocal counterarguments to the claim 
that metaphysical realism should be adopted if it is false. This amounts to a normative 
consideration in favour of metaphysical realism. Secondly, I employ a reversed Putnamian 
BIV-argument to show that metaphysical realism is true: if metaphysical realism is false, 
we cannot assert that it is false, as its denial is only possible from God’s point of view. But 
we can assert that it is false. Hence, it is true. The conclusion, that God exists, is surely 
apt to generate the sort of incredulous stare that any metaphysically ambitious armchair 
argument is subject to. The fundamental point of the paper, however, is that no such stare 
has any epistemological status if God does not exist. No God, no God’s eye.
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committed to the following three theses2:
1. Independence: The world is (largely) made up of objects that 
are mind-, language-, and theory-independent.
2. Correspondence: Truth involves some sort of correspondence 
relation between words or thought-signs and external things 
and sets of things.
3. The Cartesianism Principle: Even an ideal theory might be rad-
ically false.
According to Putnam, these three principles presume a theory of reference 
in which “occult rays – call them ‘noetic rays’ – connect words and thought-
signs to their referents.”3 Without a noetic-ray theory of reference (NTR), 
Putnam argues, metaphysical realism would be impossible. As we shall see, 
this follows from a line of reasoning that now is a philosophical classic:
P1. If I am a brain in vat (BIV), I cannot assert/form the thought 
that I am a BIV.
P2. I can assert/form the thought that I am a BIV.
C. Therefore, by philosophical necessity, I am not a BIV.
P3. If metaphysical realism is true, then I could be a BIV.
C2. Therefore, metaphysical realism is false.
The justification for P1 goes as follows. Presumably, if we are BIVs, we have 
never interacted with actual brains  – only the brain-looking things com-
posed of electrical signals, created by the evil scientist. So how on earth 
are we to refer to real brains – something we have never interacted with? It 
seems that the BIV, in that case, would need an ability to ‘magically’ think 
about objects it neither constructs nor interacts with. If we reject the NTR, 
however, then no BIV could assert/form the thought that it is a brain in a 
vat, and P1 is true. 
P2 is to be grasped by examining our own conceptual scheme. “‘Ob-
jects’ do not exist independently of conceptual schemes,” Putnam writes, 
rather, “we cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another 
scheme of description. Since the objects and the signs are alike internal to 
the scheme of description, it is possible to say what matches what.”4 Only 
if we believe in the NTR could we be radically wrong about what our words 
2 Tim Button, The Limits of Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7-10.
3 Putnam, 51.
4 Ibid., 52.
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and thoughts refer to. Hence, if we reject the NTR, then we can be absolute-
ly certain that we can form the thought that we are brains in vats.
The truth of P3 is less controversial. The Cartesianism Principle states that 
we could be radically wrong about nearly everything, and the BIV-case is just 
an instance of this larger scheme. 
We hence see that the soundness of the argument (P1 and P2) turns on 
the NTR. If one postulates a noetic-ray reference relation, then a BIV could 
refer to things in “metaphysical reality,” and neither being a BIV nor meta-
physical realism would be a philosophical impossibility. That’s great, you say, 
but why would you believe in the NTR? Apart from the seeming queerness of 
a noetic-ray, we have the semantic worry that the ray, granted that it exists, 
might refer uncontrollably. If metaphysical realism is true, how is it that we 
can talk about any one thing rather than any other? Without a proper theory 
of reference-fixation, metaphysical realists, in a very literal way, have abso-
lutely no clue what they are talking about.
II. Fixing Reference
If we examine our own behaviour and mental content in isolation, reference 
is underdetermined. This follows from Quine’s observation that a fully com-
petent field linguist cannot determine, given a certain set of linguistic evi-
dence, whether natives talk about rabbits when they say ‘gavagai,’ pointing 
to rabbits on grass, or, say, rabbits-on-grass.5 Kripke’s famous arguments in 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language further establish that I cannot 
determine whether I have previously meant quus6 or plus by ‘plus’ based on my 
own dispositions and mental states.7 These indeterminacy problems funda-
mentally rest in the interplay between human finitude and the infinite nature 
of semantic content. “Rabbit” or “plus” have an infinite number of possible 
applications, whereas human beings only have a finite number of behaviours 
or mental dispositions. Hence, there are simply too few behavioural and men-
tal facts about us to decide what we refer to.
So, if facts about us do not fix reference, perhaps there is something in 
the interplay between us and the world that does? Perhaps our non-linguistic 
interaction with rabbits precludes us from referring to gavagais (or similar 
5 See Willard Van Orman Quine, The Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
Revised Edition 1992), 31-37.
6 The function quus (a,b) outputs plus (a,b) if a and b are both smaller than or equal to the 
largest number n previously used by S in an arithmetical computation. If a or b is larger than 
n, quus (a,b) outputs 5. Thus, there is no way, based on the previous behaviours of S, to tell 
which one S has used. 
7 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1982).
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permutations). For abstract entities like plus, we would have to postulate an 
intellectual interaction of the sort that Plato imagined; an immediate grasp 
of the form of plus instead of quus. If that were the case, we wouldn’t have 
to rely on facts about dispositions or behaviours to fix reference; simple in-
teraction would do.
The first problem for the metaphysical realist here is that we seem to 
interact with gavagais (and countless other permutations) every time we in-
teract with rabbits that happen to be on grass, making it impossible to decide 
whether we interact with gavagais or rabbits when we interact with rabbits 
on grass. If that is the case, reference is not fixed. A second, more pertinent 
issue, is that it looks like metaphysical realism has to go if interaction fixes 
reference. For then sceptical BIV-cases are impossible, as Putnam saw, and the 
Cartesianism Principle is false. Without further assumptions, non-linguistic 
interaction cannot do the job of fixing reference for the metaphysical realist. 
Here, we need to get our metaphysical hands dirty. Perhaps the world helps 
us a great deal in referring correctly? 
This would be the case if the actual world is cut up in pre-existing objects 
that roughly match those of our conceptual schemes. Such a world would be 
inhabited only by rabbits, and literally no gavagais (or any similar permuta-
tions of similar objects); pluses, but no quuses. Let us call this the few-ob-
jects-solution. If the world is cut up in such a way, any interaction (causal 
or ostensive) with rabbits would fix reference, as I have literally not, at the 
same time, interacted with a gavagai (or any similar permutation). This the-
ory can use interaction to fix reference without giving up the Cartesianism 
Principle. Radical skeptical scenarios are possible in worlds mostly consisting 
of objects that do not match those of our conceptual schemes, but we are 
(plausibly) not actually located in one of them.
A closely related alternative would be a Lewisian eliteness theory, on 
which the world itself connects our words and thought-signs with its objects.8 
The idea is that objects have more or less elite properties, and that it is eas-
ier to refer to an object the more elite properties it has. Elite properties are 
the most fundamental properties in reality; they are ‘joint-carving,’ as Lewis 
puts it. And we intuitively think that rabbitness carves reality at its joints to a 
higher degree than gavagainess; rabbits form a natural kind, we think, whereas 
gavagais make up an artificial kind, fabricated for use in thought experiments. 
So the solution to the first problem is that we refer to rabbits instead of 
gavagais because rabbitness is an elite property. The solution to the second 
problem is that elite objects are so easy to refer to that even a BIV could 
do it: the ‘magnetic’ pull from the elite objects outside the vat manages to 
8 David Lewis, “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61, 
no. 4 (1983): 343-377.
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draw the noetic-ray to them in such a way that BIV’s comes to be radically 
deceived. Thus, the Cartesianism Principle remains intact.
I will neither develop these theories in any more detail nor take a stance 
on which one is correct, but I suspect that the metaphysical realist must ac-
cept one of them or a combination of both. For either we fix reference in iso-
lation, or the interplay between us and the world fixes reference, or the world 
fixes reference for us. The first alternative is implausible, the second needs 
the few-objects-solution in order to avoid indeterminacy, and the third needs 
to postulate elite properties. Indeed, Putnam introduces these very theories 
as metaphysically realist solutions to the problems he presents. The few-ob-
jects-solution should correspond to what he (pejoratively) calls “Medieval 
Essentialism,” and eliteness theory would be what he (pejoratively) calls a 
theory of “Self-Identifying Objects.”
If we nevertheless accept one of these theories, we would have to uphold 
a distinction between what we might call primary and secondary concepts. 
On the few-objects-solution, <rabbit> and <plus> are primary, because they 
correspond to actual objects in reality, and <gavagai> and <quus> would be 
secondary, as they are fictional linguistic constructions. On eliteness-theory, 
the primary <rabbit> and <plus> correspond to objects with many elite prop-
erties, whilst the secondary <gavagai> and <quus> refer to objects with very 
few elite properties. But can we uphold such a distinction? As Putnam notes, 
there would be an eerie symmetry between them;9 we could define ‘gavagai’ 
relying on the primary concept <rabbit>, but we could also define ‘rabbit’ using 
secondary concepts. Assuming that the Oxford Dictionary gets the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of rabbits right, we define ‘Gavagai’ and ‘Havagai’ 
as follows:
Gavagai = df. a gregarious burrowing plant-eating mammal, with 
long ears, long hind legs, and a short tail only existing on grass.
Havagai = df. a gregarious burrowing plant-eating mammal, with 
long ears, long hind legs, and a short tail only existing outside 
of grass.
Thus, we are in a position to define rabbit:
Rabbit = df. a gavagai or a havagai
Thus, given that we could define ‘gavagai’ and ‘havagai’ relying on the con-
cept <rabbit>, but ‘rabbit’ relying on the concepts <gavagai> and <havagai>, 
how are we to determine which are primary? What if rabbits are secondary 
9 Putnam, 36-37.
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linguistic constructions/less elite objects, and gavagai and havagai real/elite? 
If that were the case, the few-objects-solution or eliteness theory needs to 
explain why we do not quickly find ourselves in variants of the BIV-cases that 
Putnam wants to get rid of. Pose that I (for some reason) have only interact-
ed with rabbits on grass. If gavagais and havagais are primary, then, ‘rabbit’ 
would refer to gavagais. But then all my current beliefs of the form ‘rabbits 
could locate themselves on space-coordinate x’ would be false when x is not 
on grass. Obviously, this is but one instance of a larger problem that could 
render nearly all of our beliefs false. Thus, the few-objects-theorist and the 
eliteness-theorist would need to answer the question: 
(i) Why is the world such that its primary objects roughly are 
those we think are primary?
The only answer to (i), as I can see it, would be to posit metaphysical an-
thropocentrism; the thesis that reality itself is carved out roughly along the 
lines that human beings carve it. If metaphysical anthropocentrism is true, 
then most of the objects we deem to be primary would be primary, and most 
objects we deem to be secondary would be secondary. (Note that metaphy-
sical anthropocentrism does not entail that human beings are metaphysically 
privileged in any way; it could be that the order of the world just happens to 
coincide with the way we order things, or that the furniture of the world has 
been adapted to fit our schemes by a being vastly more metaphysically privi-
leged than us. We will investigate these two possibilities in the coming part). 
Another way to phrase this view, close to Putnam’s formulation, is that 
metaphysical realism requires that human beings potentially enjoy a God’s 
eye point of view. Obviously, we are not omniscient, and we could in fact be 
radically wrong about everything, but we are actually set in a position so as 
to know a great deal about the objects of reality. This is why Putnam pro-
claims that the God’s Eye point of view is the favourite point of view for the 
metaphysical realist. Otherwise, there is simply no way of fixing the “noetic 
ray” without at the same time allowing for extreme skepticism.
III. Metaphysical Realism with a Human Face?
Metaphysical realists must therefore be metaphysical anthropocentrists. In 
what follows, I argue that it is impossible to square metaphysical anthro-
pocentrism with naturalism10 and very easy to square it with some kind of 
monotheism. Therefore, unless a better alternative can be presented, which is 
doubtful, the metaphysical realist must ontologically commit to God.
10 I will define naturalism as the thesis that there are no supernatural entities.
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If our best scientific theories are correct, human beings have existed for 
about 200.000 years in a universe that came about 13.8 billion years ago. Fur-
ther, human beings inhabit an extremely small slice of the universe, and could 
very well be but one member of a large set of intelligent species. Therefore, a 
naturalistic explanation of metaphysical anthropocentrism could not posit that 
the universe itself is carved in a way that fits human conceptual schemes; that 
would simply be absurd.
Instead, the naturalistic account must be that human beings have evolved 
to carve their conception of reality in line with reality itself, thereby answering 
(i). The problem here, however, is that human beings primarily have evolved to 
survive and reproduce. Thus, it simply does not matter whether one derives nour-
ishment from a gavagai or a havagai or a rabbit, for as Quine has shown, these 
hypotheses are empirically indistinguishable (and thus, physically indistinguish-
able). For the same reason, we could not postulate a multiverse, where human 
beings, due to the anthropic principle, come to exist in a universe fine-tuned to 
our conceptual schemes. Ceteris Paribus, a universe inhabited by gavagais and 
havagais and a universe inhabited by rabbits are empirically indistinguishable. 
Therefore, human observers have the exact same observation-conditions in 
both, but only in one world would they carve reality as it is (assuming that they 
carve reality either along rabbit-lines or gavagai and havagai-lines). Hence, we 
lack evolutionary reason to think that our conceptual schemes match reality.
Moreover, we have positive reasons to think that they should not match re-
ality on evolutionary grounds. In his recent work The Case Against Reality, MIT 
cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman presents and describes the Fitness-Beats-
Truth theorem (FTB Theorem) in evolutionary game theory, according to which 
evolutionary strategies maximising fitness at the expense of correct representa-
tion always beat strategies accurately depicting reality. The conclusion is that 
any given perception almost certainly is non-veridical:
Darwin’s idea of natural selection entails the FBT Theorem, 
which in turn entails that the lexicon of our perceptions – in-
cluding space, time, shape, hue, saturation, brightness, texture, 
taste, sound, smell, and motion – cannot describe reality as it is 
when no one looks. It’s not simply that this or that perception is 
wrong. It’s that none of our perceptions, being couched in this 
language, could possibly be right.11
Hoffman’s conclusions are by no means uncontroversial, and evolutionary 
game theory is a young and emerging field. But I suspect that the FBT theo-
11 Donald D. Hoffman, The Case Against Reality: How Evolution Hid the Truth from our Eyes 
(London: Allen Lane, 2019), 125.
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rem points us in the right direction when constructing an evolutionary epis-
temology for metaphysics. If we have evolved primarily for survival, we have 
reason to believe that our faculties do not mirror how reality carves at the 
joints, as the cost of getting metaphysics correct outweighs any benefit as-
sociated with it.
Hence, naturalism seems like a no-go for an explanation of metaphysical 
anthropocentrism. Instead, it looks like the metaphysical realist needs some-
thing along the lines of the Christian view, on which God creates the world in 
an orderly fashion so that human beings, by virtue of their reason, can come 
to know this order. As John 1:1 states: “In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God” – and Genesis 1:27: “God 
created mankind in his own image.” St. Augustine interprets these passages as 
God taking unformed matter (nothing), molding it into determinate objects 
(almost nothing) subordinated the Forms, so that human beings can interact 
with them:
For thou, O Lord, hadst made the world out of unformed mat-
ter, and this thou didst make out of nothing and didst make it 
into almost nothing. From it thou hast then made these great 
things which we, the sons of men, marvel at.12
If something like St. Augustine’s picture is right, metaphysical anthropocen-
trism has an explanation. The answer to (i) is that God carved out the world 
in a way that roughly corresponds to how human beings come to carve it, 
because God has a special relationship with us. This does not mean that we 
know absolutely everything about the nature of reality, for we are limited 
beings prone to epistemic error, and we can only get a grasp of The Good and 
other privileged universals through their instantiations in discrete particulars 
we meet in our sensory world. Nevertheless, it suffices to preclude BIV-cases 
from holding in the actual world. And fortunately so, for such cases would 
reduce metaphysical realism to ultimate absurdity, as Putnam rightly pointed 
out.
The contours of this theistic answer to Putnam’s critique of metaphysical 
realism were already sketched by Plantinga in 1988: 
You might be inclined to accept (1) the Putnamian proposition 
that we do know that we are not brains in a vat, (2) the anti-Put-
namian claim that metaphysical realism is true and antirealism a 
mere Kantian galimatias, and (3) the quasi-Putnamian proposi-
12 Saint Augustine of Hippo, Confessions and Enchiridion, trans. Albert C. Outler (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1955), 12:6; 209-10.
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tion that if metaphysical realism is true and there is no such per-
son God who has created us and our world, adapting the former 
to the latter, then we would not know that we are not brains in 
a vat; if so, then you have a theistic argument.13
To my knowledge, no one has developed Plantinga’s argument in any detail 
except Daniel Bonevac,14 who renders it deeply implausible. Because mean-
ing needs to be grounded in a “supernatural, infinite, eternal, necessary, ob-
jective, normative, and independent causal power,” and only God has these 
properties, we need to be ontologically committed to God; “if there were no 
God, there would be no meaning,” Bonevac concludes.15 This is an interesting 
argument, but the present issue is not whether there are meanings, but which 
meanings our expressions carry. Even if we grant that God grounds meanings, 
how does He know which one to assign a given expression? If there is some 
fact in reality to settle it, which only God knows, then He is clearly not need-
ed. If there is no such fact, and God does guesswork, then the account clearly 
relies on magic. Here, Bonevac16 bites the bullet: “Any account of semantic 
capacities must at some point resort to magic. And the best explanation we 
have for that magic involves God.” It confounds me how any magical phe-
nomena could have a best explanation. Does it then not seize to be magical? 
I think we ought to reject magic and Bonevac’s argument with it. An anthro-
pocentric world is to be postulated precisely because it is the only world in 
which a metaphysically realist theory of reference does not need to rely on it.
Might there be non-monotheistic rivals that explain metaphysical an-
thropocentrism? I doubt it. Atheistic explanations within a naturalistic frame-
work would fail for the reasons outlined above. Hence, they might postulate 
‘non-theistic’ supernatural forces/entities that carve reality and/or set human 
beings in a relation to know it. But this is obviously at the expense of moving 
too close to the God-idea; the account becomes one of theology rather than 
atheology, thus undercutting itself. Hence, we are left with monotheism or 
polytheism. However, the dilemma for polytheisms is that we either must 
postulate alternate realities carved by different gods, in which case we have 
an unacceptable relativism, or find ourselves governed by a plethora of ex-
13 Alvin Plantinga, “Appendix: Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments,” in Alvin Platinga, ed. 
Deane-Peter Baker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 203-228. 
14 Daniel Bonevac, “(N) The Putnamian Argument, (O) The Argument from Reference, and (P) 
The Kripke-Wittgenstein Argument from Plus and Quus,” in Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for 
God, eds. Jerry L. Walls, and Trent Dougherty, 214-234 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
15 Ibid., 228.
16 Ibid., 227.
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planatorily superfluous demi-gods that do not carve reality at its joints.17 In 
neither case are we able to explain the comprehensibility of reality – indeed, 
that very notion finds its genealogical roots in monotheism: 
Modern science, from the time of Newton, and the founding of 
the Royal Society in London in 1660, assumes the existence of 
one world that reason could investigate. That stemmed from a 
theistic belief in the one God who had created it. Their belief 
that one mind permeated the universe gave early scientists in the 
modern age the confidence to assume that there was one ratio-
nal structure built into the nature of things, and that one Reason 
had produced it. The fact they believed that humans were made 
in the image of the one God also gave them assurance that hu-
man rationality had the capability of unlocking, at least in part, 
the secrets of the physical universe. This gave answers to the 
question of why the physical world should behave a uniform way 
and why should it be accessible to human rationality.18
We conclude that metaphysical anthropocentrism relies on monotheism. 
Whether this monotheism conforms to any one of the multitudinous inter-
pretations of Islam, Judaism, Deism or Christianity, however, is by no means 
settled. Such a fact, if we will ever come to know it, could only be established 
by work in philosophy and theology.
To summarise the argumentation thus forth. Part I stated that metaphys-
ical realism needs a noetic-ray theory of reference, and that a noetic-ray the-
ory of reference needs a theory of reference-fixation. Part II argued that the 
noetic-ray can be fixed only if the world has elite objects or contains few ob-
jects, and that both the eliteness-theory and the few-objects-solution require 
metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to avoid extreme scepticism. In this 
part, we stated that monotheism is the best, and probably the only, explana-
tion for metaphysical anthropocentrism. Thus, the metaphysical realist must 
ontologically commit to God. No God, no God’s eye. 
IV. Interlude
17 For example, pose that there is a set of gods who carve the world in different ways. If all 
gods are correct in their carvings, the world will fundamentally be in many different, contradic-
tory ways, and an incoherent sort of relativism holds. So we might then privilege one scheme
of description imposed on ‘prime matter’ by one god (or several gods who agree in their carv-
ing of it). But then it is unclear why we, equipped with Ockham’s Razor, should believe in more 
than one God.
18 Roger Trigg, Monotheism and Religious Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
2020), 15.
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Before we move on, however, we must attend to Putnam’s Just-More-Theory 
manouvre against metaphysically realist theories of reference-fixation. Model 
Theory shows that there are indefinite ways to make a theory true (and false). 
For example, the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem can be used to show that one 
can make true all sentences in a physical theory by interpreting them as pro-
positions about the natural numbers. Putnam has an informal proof in the Ap-
pendix of Reason, Truth and History showing that in all possible worlds “the 
cherry is in the tree” has the same truth conditions as “the cherry* is in the 
tree*,” where ‘cherry*’ sometimes refers to cherries and sometimes to cats, 
and ‘tree*’ sometimes refers to trees and sometimes to mats. Thus, reference 
seems inscrutable, at least in relation to mere alethic considerations.
At this point, we might say (as we already have) that these problems are 
solved in a reality ordered by God, where queer entities like trees* and cher-
ries* either aren’t elite or do not exist, and interaction and/or magnetism fixes 
reference. The problem that Putnam raises, however, is that “Interaction and/
or magnetism fixes reference in a reality ordered by God” is itself formulated 
in a language subject to permutation. Perhaps that very sentence is just stat-
ing a truth about natural numbers or cherries: there would be no empirically 
available way to know. And of course, we cannot stipulate that it refers to 
what we think it does, since this would just be to add just more theory, which 
in turn can be permuted. 
Here, Button distinguishes two sorts of epistemic worries: Cartesian 
angst and Kantian angst.19 Cartesian angst is the worry that we might have 
radically false beliefs about the things our statements refer to. Kantian angst 
is the worry that we might have radically false beliefs about what our state-
ments refer to. But Kantian angst is literally an impossible situation to be in. 
If the worry is legitimate, one couldn’t even describe it, as ‘Kantian angst’ 
might well refer to cherries or natural numbers. As there is no way of knowing 
whether one’s theory of reference is right on metaphysical realism, and this 
warrants Kantian angst, which is incoherent, Button concludes that meta-
physical realism itself is epistemically incoherent and ought to be discarded.
The way out of this is simple. The metaphysical realist should agree that 
we ought not believe in a philosophical position warranting Kantian Angst, 
because that would be epistemically incoherent. But she should affirm, in a 
Moorean fashion, that we ought to believe in Metaphysical Realism, because 
it is true. Therefore, Metaphysical Realism does not warrant Kantian angst 
– we could not be wholly deluded about the meaning and reference of our 
words, for that would make it impossible to rationally hold our position. This 
response, however, will require us to demonstrate the truth of metaphysical 
realism, and to that we attend in the following part.
19 Button, 60.
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V. Metaphysical Realism is True
I sense an incredulous stare. If we agree that God is what it takes to save 
metaphysical realism, why espouse it at all? It is sometimes said that one per-
son’s modus ponens is another person’s modus tollens, so why not run with 
the following argument:
1. If metaphysical realism is true, then God exists.
2. God does not exist / ‘God exists’ is meaningless and thus not 
true.
3. Therefore, metaphysical realism is not true.
However, is such a modus tollens argument possible here? Recall the three 
theses of metaphysical realism. Independence states that the world is (large-
ly) made up of objects that are mind-, language-, and theory-independent. 
Correspondence reads that truth involves some sort of correspondence rela-
tion between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things, 
and the Cartesianism Principle is that even an ideal theory might be radically 
false. If we give up metaphysical realism, these theses would have to go,20 
and without them, what Putnam calls the internalist perspective would reign.21 
But I shall argue that this perspective is a philosophical impossibility. There-
fore, metaphysical realism is true.
According to the internalist perspective, 
there is no God’s Eye point of view that we can know or use-
fully imagine; there are only the various points of view of ac-
20 Citing De Morgan, the anti-metaphysical realist could jettison only one of these principles. 
But any such position would be absurd. Consider correspondence and independence. Either 
one is left with a determinate set of mind-independent objects one cannot talk about (reject 
independence, keep correspondence), or one has to talk about a determinate set of mind-inde-
pendent objects that do not exist (keep correspondence, reject independence). Consequently, 
one has to get rid of both if one is to get rid of one. Further, the Cartesianism Principle is equiv-
alent to independence and correspondence. If one rejects correspondence and independence, 
then truth must be identified with some kind of coherence theory/ideal rational acceptability, 
in which case the Cartesianism Principle is false, and if one affirms correspondence and inde-
pendence, then our statements and beliefs correspond to mind-independent reality and could 
be radically false. 
21 Like Putnam, I will assume a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and the internalist 
perspective. Button argues for a third position in between, but it is unclear what it exactly 
amounts to (see Button, 221). Further, his main reason for rejecting metaphysical realism is his 
disdain for magical theories of reference, but there is no reason to think that a metaphysically 
realist theory of reference needs magic if God exists. Hence, I will not entertain this third po-
sition in the current context.
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tual persons reflecting various interests and purposes that their 
descriptions and theories subserve (‘Coherence theory of truth;’ 
‘Non-realism;’ ‘Verificationism;’ ‘Pluralism;’ ‘Pragmatism;’ are all 
terms that have been applied to the internalist perspective…).22
Thus, the internalist rejects Independence, as the structure of the world is not 
something “out there” for us to discover, Correspondence, as truth must be 
identified with some kind of ideal rational acceptability/coherence, and the 
Cartesianism Principle, as we cannot be deluded about everything. 
However, if we jettison these principles, it clearly seems impossible to 
assert that the internalist perspective is true. In doing so, the internalist is 
either stating a truth immanent to her own conceptual scheme, in which case 
she is making no more than a testimony of her own ideology, or talking about 
ultimate reality, in which case she is taking on God’s point of view. In the first 
case, one seems to lack any reason to listen, and in the second case, one is no 
longer talking to an internalist.
Here, we could argue that it is fully intelligible to assert internalism with-
out having to take on God’s point of view, deflating the strong requirements 
for assertion assumed above. Richard Rorty offers Wittgenstein and Heideg-
ger as examples of good role models here:
This is an awkward, but not impossible, position. Wittgenstein 
and Heidegger manage it fairly well. One reason they manage 
it as well as they do is that they do not think that when we say 
something we must necessarily be expressing a view about a sub-
ject. We might just be saying something – participating in a con-
versation rather than contributing to an inquiry. Perhaps saying 
things is not always saying how things are. Perhaps saying that 
is itself not a case of saying how things are. Both men suggest 
we see people as saying things, better or worse things, without 
seeing them as externalizing inner representations of reality.23
As I can see it, however, Rorty’s proposal is genuinely unintelligible. In order 
to say something of philosophical value, one must say how things are: I can-
not say that “reality is nothing but a linguistic construction, but not actual-
ly.” You cannot even criticise the content of this paragraph unless you think 
that it actually fails to capture something about the nature of assertion. “Just 
saying something,” in the Rortyan sense, is incoherent. The internalist must 
22 Putnam, 50.
23 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1979), 385.
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take on God’s point of view in order to assert or even think that internalism 
is true. 
But perhaps the internalist does not need to do so; perhaps she could just 
start phrasing herself in new, interesting and fruitful replacements of earlier, 
metaphysically realist frameworks without explicitly stating that internalism 
is true. This is the general strategy of internalist philosophers like Carnap, 
Wittgenstein, Quine, Rorty, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida. Phi-
losophy, conceived as a Mirror of Nature, is simply set aside, and internalistic 
languages that promote theoretical and/or practical aims are adopted.
This project, however, must rely on some kind of normative framework. 
It forces us to ask the question why we ought to choose any one language 
over any other – in particular, why we ought to choose an internalist lan-
guage over a metaphysically realist one (say, Sider’s ontologese). Here, Put-
nam seeks to ground the answer to such value questions in an account of 
human cognitive flourishing:
Bereft of the old realist idea of truth as ‘correspondence’ and of 
the positivist idea of justification as fixed by public ‘criteria,’ we 
are left with the necessity of seeing our search for better con-
ceptions of rationality as an intentional human activity, which, 
like every activity that rises above habit and the mere following 
of inclination or obsession, is guided by our idea of the good.24
We ought to reject metaphysically realist languages, then, because pluralism 
and diversity – sought to be reduced/removed by the metaphysical realist – 
“is part of the ideal” of human cognitive flourishing.25
The problem for this strategy, however, is that there is significant dis-
agreement as to what the ideal of human flourishing is and how it relates to 
the idea of the good. Plato would disagree that conceptual pluralism or di-
versity is good, yet part of the idea of human flourishing, and so would other 
metaphysical realists in his footnotes. However, it is hard to see how there 
could be non-verbal, fundamental disputes about these issues if metaphysi-
cal realism is false. Arguing which definition of ‘good’ or ‘human flourishing’ 
is right would be like arguing with a BIV about the definition of ‘brain;’ in the 
best scenario, we would mutually give true analyses of ‘brain,’ ‘human flour-
ishing’ or ‘good,’ in our respective languages, but we would not disagree.
This incommensurability of normative ideals is explored in Eklund’s 
Choosing Normative Concepts, which lets us imagine a Moral Twin Earth, 
where bad guys use a concept <ought*>, such that bad things, according to 
24 Putnam, 137.
25 Ibid., 148.
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our moral concepts, ought* to be done (and we use a concept <ought>, such 
that bad* things, according to the bad guys’ concepts, ought to be done).26 
If there is no privileged concept corresponding to ‘ought,’ and thus no privi-
leged concept of the good, both parties can state seemingly incompatible 
truths using different nearby concepts, and there could be no real dispute. 
And of course, we could not spell out the disagreement with a notion of 
conceptual privilege or correctness relying on normative concepts (say, by 
the view that the fundamental dispute concerns what concepts we ought 
to use), since that would be to rely on the very concepts we are trying to 
choose. It seems that it is only if there is a joint-carving, elite concept of the 
good – such as a platonic form of the good – that we could even hope to 
account for non-verbal debates about matters of the good. In that case, we 
would utter incompatible statements about one form of the good instead 
of uttering compatible statements true internally to our various normati-
ve concepts. But to posit that the world itself privileges certain normative 
concepts over others, say, through a platonic realm of forms that we can 
collectively describe, necessitates the truth of metaphysical realism and the 
rejection of the internalist perspective, and is thus not an admissible option 
for the internalist.
To get around platonism (or any other metaphysics on which there is a 
privileged notion related to ‘good’ or ‘human flourishing’), the only way out 
for the internalist seems to be to concede that disputes about theory-choice 
will ultimately be merely verbal, but to deny the importance of this fact. 
This line is taken by Thomasson, who argues that philosophical disputes are 
really forms of “meta-linguistic negotiation.” This sort of negotiation is to 
be understood in the realm of “pragmatics – the ways in which speakers 
use these utterances to reinforce or alter the norms for using the terms in 
question,”27 rather than the realm of semantics, evading the necessity of 
some privileged platonic form supplying diverging concepts with a common 
referent. In linguistic negotiation, participants have the goal of influencing 
each other to adopt certain ontological vocabularies, rather than stating 
truths using privileged concepts. And there is something very plausible with 
Thomasson’s proposal: it is not as if we would lay down flat if bad guys 
came to earth to declare that they ought* to eat us, just because ‘earthlings 
ought* to be eaten’ comes out true. A dispute about whether we ought (or 
ought*) to be eaten seems to persist even if the referents of these concepts 
do not coincide: therefore, a correct account of disagreement does not need 
to suppose that they do.
26 Matti Eklund, Choosing Normative Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 26.
27 Amie Thomasson, “Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation,” Analytic Philos-
ophy 58, no. 1 (2017): 13.
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However, the consequences of this account of disagreement for the 
pursuit of philosophy ought not be underestimated. On this picture, there 
cannot be any meaningful distinction between persuasion and argumentation, 
since arguments exist to reinforce or alter behaviour rather than guide us 
towards the truth. Taken to its logical conclusion, Thomasson’s pragmatic 
theory of disagreement means that discursive (or non-discursive) violence is 
the only arbiter in questions of ontology, since one’s success in meta-linguis-
tic negotiation is directly proportional to the effectiveness of one’s methods 
of rhetorical manipulation. It might be the case that the most instrumental 
way for me to get someone to stop using the concept C is to speak kindly to 
them (because people are more amenable to act or speak differently if they 
do not feel forced to do so), but there is no principled distinction between 
(what on the surface looks like) peaceful discussion and outright violence. 
This violent element latent in pragmatism was effectively brought to light 
by Russell in his infamous criticism of James’ theory of truth, but his observa-
tions apply equally well here: 
If there is a non-human truth, which one man may know, while 
another does not, there is a standard outside the disputants, to 
which, we may urge, the dispute ought to be submitted. If, on 
the contrary, the only way of discovering which of the dispu-
tants is in the right is to wait and see which of them is successful, 
there is no longer any principle except force by which the issue 
can be decided.28
Let us then negotiate. I do not think that it is useful or good to adopt this 
concept of disagreement, because I think the violence it entails should be re-
jected on moral grounds. Thus, I wish to influence the reader to let go of the 
pragmatic account of disagreement that Thomasson is proposing, and I hope 
that some of the considerations lifted above help in doing so. Since a non-prag-
matic account of disagreement could not even begin to account for normative 
disputes on internal realism (given Eklund’s Moral Twin Earth-considerations), 
and since Putnam is correct in viewing normative disputes as fundamental to 
ontology once both metaphysical realism and positivism is given up, we thus 
stand without a good theory of what it would even mean for the internalist to 
disagree with the metaphysical realist if we accept internalism. They cannot say 
that internalism is true of the world as such, because then they would no long-
er be internalists. Neither can they say that internalism ought to be adopted 
without either begging the question against metaphysically realist normative 
concepts (understood semantically), or practicing a sort of linguistic violence 
28 Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays (London: Longman’s, Green and Co., 1910), 126.
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(understood pragmatically) that we ought to reject. In neither case do we have 
reason to listen to what the internalists are saying.
Thus, I think we ought to reject internalism even if it is true (whatever that 
would mean), because it is an impracticable doctrine that is not even asserti-
ble: and I can further see no non-equivocal counterargument to this normative 
thesis that does not assume the truth of metaphysical realism, because of its 
assuming there to be a common idea of the good that we are attempting to 
analyse, or some normative fact of the matter that we are trying to mirror. As 
pragmatic considerations really are the only standards by which to adjudicate 
disputes about theory-choice if we get rid of metaphysical realism, metaphy-
sical realism is to be accepted even if it turns out to be factually incorrect 
(whatever that would mean). Thus, internalism is incoherent, and metaphysical 
realism is true. 
I admit that this will hardly be convincing to someone not impressed by 
pragmatic modes of reasoning in metaphysics; indeed, it probably only clarifies 
the absurdity inherent in the whole pragmatist project. Thankfully, however, 
metaphysical realism is not ultimately to be adopted on practical grounds – 
surprisingly, it is true by the very argumentative scheme Putnam used against it. 
We have seen that internalists cannot coherently assert or externalise their “in-
ner representations of reality” without ceasing to be internalists – indeed, that 
there is no coherent way they can formulate their position. Hence, we note that 
their situation is identical to that of a brain-in-a-vat: as the BIV, bereft a noetic 
ray, cannot be located in a vat if it understands it is in one, so the philosopher 
cannot be located in a sort of internal reality if she can form the belief that she 
is. Internal realism takes possible brains out of vats only by putting philosophers’ 
brains back in them. But we have a sound argument against being a BIV if in-
ternalism is true, formulated by Putnam himself. We proceed to use it to prove 
metaphysical realism and the falsity of the internalist perspective:
P1*. If the internalist perspective holds, I cannot assert/form the 
thought that it is true. 
P2*. I can assert/form the thought that the internalist perspective 
is true. 
C1*. Therefore, the internalist perspective is false. 
P3*. If the internalist perspective is false, then metaphysical real-
ism is true. 
C*. Therefore, metaphysical realism is true. 
We conclude that metaphysical realism is true. But as we have seen, metaphys-
ical realism is an intelligible position only if some kind of monotheism holds. 
Therefore, God exists.
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